ABSTRACT In the Internet of Things, based on the collaboration of sensing nodes, sensing data are collected and transmitted. The collaboration of sensing nodes also plays an important role in the safeguard of the Internet of Things. Owing to the limited ability of the single sensing node, the threshold authentication based on the collaboration of sensing nodes can improve the trust of security authentication of sensing nodes. The current threshold authentication schemes may require high-computational complexity, and more importantly, most of them are instantiated by membership authentication. It's challenging to apply the current state of the arts to the case where sensing nodes with various weights join together to fulfill a relatively lightweight authentication. In this paper, we first design a communication key distribution scheme for sensing networks based on a symmetric operator. Using the permutation function, the scheme is able to generate characteristic sequences to improve the efficiency of key distribution in sensing networks. In addition, we propose a threshold authentication scheme based on weights, in which the higher weight represents the more important role in authentication. Our authentication scheme only requires lightweight operations, so that, it is extremely friendly to the IoT nodes with restricted computation power. The security analysis and the case verification demonstrate that our novel authentication protects IoT nodes without yielding significantly computational burden to the nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is an advanced framework to connect a considerable amount of objects (with WiFi or 4G communication functionalities), in practice, to the Internet, so as to fill the technical gap between the Internet and the terminal [1] - [10] . Compared with the traditional Internet, IoT may assemble many heterogeneous sensor networks that make the network security more sophisticated and further difficult to be analyzed. Being one of the secure underpinnings of IoT, security authentication has become a research hotspot in recent years.
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Security authentication is one of the core mechanisms used in the perceptual layer. Many cryptographic tools are able to be employed to achieve authentication protocols, e.g., symmetric-key authentication [11] , public-key authentication [12] - [14] , key-shared authentication [15] , dynamic user authentication [16] , [17] and many others [18] - [24] . Public-key authentication (PKA) mainly includes a hybridkey management protocol based on the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and the symmetric-key cryptography [12] , the RSA-based TinyPK authentication scheme [13] and the distributed public-key authentication cooperative scheme [14] . A PKA protocol could be deployed in the perceptual layer to guarantee secure authentication among sensor nodes. Due to a large number of exponential operations incurred by asymmetric encryption technique, the overhead of IOT is extremely increased along with the number of nodes.
Symmetric-key authentication (SKA) consists of several secure ingredients. For example, security framework protocol SPINS [11] consists of network security encryption protocol SNEP, time-based high-tolerant loss packet flow-based protocol µTESLA, multi-level µTESLA authentication protocol and one-way key chain authentication scheme. Different from heavy computational complexity required by PKA, SKA only requires lower computation (i.e. low energy consumption), which is a better candidate for sensor nodes. However, since all symmetric keys are shared by sensor nodes and sink node, if sink node has the single node invalidation, all symmetric keys may leak
In [15] , a secret-shared distributed authentication protocol is proposed to effectively reduce the calculation and energy consumption in the encryption and decryption stages of perceived nodes. However, it is necessary to design a mechanism to coordinate information transmission and reception. In [16] and [17] , a dynamic user authentication protocol is proposed, which uses one-way hash function and logical XOR operation instead of key encryption, therefore improving the computation efficiency of nodes. However, as sink node is required to play the role of information center during authentication, it will bring a heavy burden for sink node. In addition, [25] - [29] focus on achieving the balance between the efficiency and the communication cost, but less progress is obtained.
Since one needs to always balance both limited computing tasks and computational power of the IoT nodes, the security and the efficiency are challenging to be achieved at the same time in the aforementioned authentications. In this paper, we first design a key distribution scheme for sensing networks based on symmetric operator. Using the permutation function, the scheme is able to generate characteristic sequences to improve the efficiency of key distribution in sensing networks. In addition, we propose a threshold authentication scheme based on weights, which only requires limited operation complexity, being very friendly to the IoT nodes. The outline of the paper is described as follows.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the related work. In section III, we propose a communication key assignment scheme based on symmetric operator. Section IV constructs the threshold authentication scheme based on weights. In Section V, we improve the threshold authentication scheme based on weights and propose two improved threshold authentication schemes based on weights. Finally, we give the conclusion and future work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditionally, security authentications in IOT focus on perceptual level security, protecting data on transmission among sensor nodes [30] . The simplest approach to perceptual level security consists of using a network-wide encryption key, such that ZigBee authentication [31] . ZigBee also provides support for cluster and individual link keys. MiniSec [32] is another well-known security authentication for IOT that provides data confidentiality, authentication and replay protection. As with ZigBee, the packet overhead introduced by MiniSec is in the order of a few bytes. The widespread TinySec perceptual layer security mechanism is no longer considered secure [32] .
Most security authentications of IOT do not consider a protocol for key distribution to sensor nodes. Keys are either loaded onto the nodes before setup or a separate key establishment protocol is used [33] - [35] . Public key cryptography (PKC) is used in traditional computing to facilitate secure key establishment. However, PKA, in particular the widespread RSA algorithm, involves too resource consuming for constrained devices. Some security authentications, such as Sizzle [36] , advocate the use of the more resource efficient Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key cryptosystem. Other research efforts, such as the secFleck [37] mote, provide support for faster RSA operations through hardware.
Approaches without PKC often rely on the pre-distribution of connection keys. Random key pre-distribution schemes, such as the q-composite scheme [38] , establish connections with a node's neighbors with a certain probability. Intuitively, pre-distributed key schemes such as this require a large amount of keys to be loaded onto the nodes before deployment. Depending on the method used, this approach is scaling in O(n 2 ) or O(n), where n is the number of nodes in the network. The Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment authentication achieves sub linear scaling in O( √ n) by relying on the other nodes as trusted intermediaries. While PIKE provides higher memory efficiency than random schemes, it still leaks additional key information when motes are captured.
In order to reduce the burden of authentication in sensor networks, end-to-end security authentications have been widespread studied. Classical end-to-end security authentications are Sizzle [36] , SSNAIL [39] and DTLS [40] . As outlined in the introduction, such a authentication protects the message payload from the data source until it reaches its target. Because end-to-end authentications are usually implemented in the network or application layer, forwarding nodes do not need to perform any additional cryptographic operations since the routing information is transmitted in the clear. On the flip side, this means end-to-end security protocols do not provide the same level of protection of a network's availability as a perceptual layer protocol could.
Security authentication for single sensor node cannot guarantee the trust of this node. Because IOT is vulnerable to network attacks and sensor nodes are vulnerable to be attacked or be captured. So, threshold authentication is involved to guarantee the trust of sensor networks. Only sensor nodes with a number exceed the threshold can achieve the authentication. Authentication with sufficiently number of sensor nodes has more trust compared with authentication with single node.
The threshold cryptography is a technique that the encryption key or signature key is dispersed into the entity or component by secret sharing technology. Only the combination of VOLUME 7, 2019 entities or components with no less than a threshold can perform an encryption or signature function [41] - [44] . A typical threshold signature is (k, n) threshold signature [45] - [48] , where only a combination of larger than or equal to k entities can be signed and otherwise signing leads to a failure. Based on this technique, in [49] , a threshold signature with privilege set proposed, where only a sufficient number of privileged set members participating in the signature can form a valid signature, while any signature that is involved in a privileged set less than the number of the threshold, even with the participation of more ordinary members, cannot be valid. In [50] , a signature scheme based on weighted threshold is proposed. Each member plays different roles in the signature scheme dependent on their weights. However, because of using the Chinese Remainder Theorem in the signature construction, the scheme requires large number of multiplications and exponentiation operations in signature, yielding significantly computational burden to IoT nodes.
Binary symmetric polynomial key distribution is widely used for secure communication in perceptual networks. The mechanism works as follows [51] . Select the binary symmet-
a ij x i y j on the prime field, where f (x, y) = f (y, x). We suppose ID 1 , ID 2 are the identity of two perceived nodes.
If
, assign the values to ID 1 , ID 2 , respectively. We have the following result,
Since the design is based on the prime number domain, the computational complexity of two variables symmetric polynomial increases rapidly with the increase of threshold, which limits its practical use in sensing networks. 
III. COMMUNICATION KEY ASSIGNMENT BASED ON SYMMETRIC OPERATOR
Assume that there are L sensing nodes in the sensing networks, which donated as:
The key distributed management center KDS chooses the symmetric operator as the key generation operator of the whole sensing networks and delivers the sub symmetric operator for each sensing node:
Then any m nodes in the sensing networks share the key
The binary symmetric polynomial also satisfies the properties of the symmetric operator. In order to improve the computation efficiency, we illustrate a symmetric operator based on GF(2 n ). The basic form of the element in GF(2 n ) domain is described as follows:
The addition and multiplication formula in GF(2 n ) domain is defined as:
where P(x) is the prime polynomial of GF(2 n ).
B. COMMUNICATION KEY ASSIGNMENT
To improve the efficiency of the identity authentication between sensing nodes, we propose a hierarchical key assignment scheme based on symmetric operator, which includes the hierarchical authentication procedure from the cluster head node to ordinary sensing node as well as the same procedure from sink node to cluster head node. Suppose there are n clusters in the sensing networks, and the cluster i has n i sensing nodes.
1) The key distributed manager KDS selects the non-degenerate matrix with (n + 1) order:
where
We let A = {A 0 , . . . . . . , A n } be the key matrix of the sensing networks, and the key matrix A can be updated. The element of the key matrix A is defined in GF(2 n ).
Assume X , Y are arbitrary m i dimension vectors, then we define
2) Suppose that the sink node and all cluster head nodes are identified as follows: (ID 0 , ID 1 , . . . ., ID n ), where ID 0 is the sink node and others are cluster head nodes. Assume that the nodes in the cluster network are identified as (ID i , ID i,1 , . . . ., ID i,n i ), where ID i is the cluster head nodes identifier, and the rest of them are sensing nodes.
Then the characteristic sequence of each node (sink node, cluster head node and ordinary node) can be defined as follows:
where Tr : R → R m i is permutation function. Let Table be a secure single-byte permutation table, Circle is a circulation towards the right and C ∈ GF(2 n ) is a constant. 
Algorithm 1
The above characteristic sequence has higher efficiency than the characteristic sequence (ID 1 , . . . ., ID m i ) T of the binary symmetric polynomial key distribution scheme.
3) The key distribution manager KDS generates the authentication key as follows
The authentication key of node ID i between sink node and cluster head node is
The authentication secret key of cluster head node ID i (i = 0) in the cluster network i iŝ
The authentication secret key of sensing node ID i,j in the cluster network i iŝ
The key distribution manager KDS encrypts the authentication key with the permanent key of member ID i (ID i,j ) and sends it to ID i (ID i,j ). ID i (ID i,j ) decrypt the message and get authentication private key. By using this method, any two members in the group will generate their private key shared by each other, which donated as:
Since the order of key matrix A i in the perceptual network is m i , the proposed scheme is a key management scheme with threshold property. In order to ensure the unconditional security of the communication between the sink node and the cluster head node, we can suppose that
At this point, even if the sink node as well as all other cluster nodes is destructed, the key matrix A 0 cannot be completely stolen. Table 1 illustrates the comparison between the efficiency of key allocation scheme in this paper and the existing binary symmetric polynomial key allocation scheme if the number of the nodes is n and the threshold is m:
C. COMPUTATION EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
In table 1, c 1 is a constant, and G, P represent a modular multiplication on GF(2 n ) and a prime field respectively. We know that G < P. It can be predicted from Table 1 that the efficiency of this scheme is higher than that of the binary symmetric polynomial key allocation scheme, whether the KDS generates the authentication private key of all nodes or the shared private key from one node to other sensing nodes. Fig.2 illustrates the computations with respect to value m, described by two characteristic sequences generated by the binary symmetric polynomial and the proposed scheme. As we can see from Fig.2 , the computation complexity (The abscissa unit is P) of the characteristic sequence obtained in this paper is much lower than that of the binary symmetric polynomial key allocation scheme. Therefore, the scheme has better computation efficiency.
Since the Tr(ID) = ((T _ID) 1 , . . . ., (T _ID) m i ) T of different ID are scattered randomly, the probability of this characteristic sequence linear associated with any m sensing nodes is 1/2 k , which k is the number of bits of ID.
Then the probability of linear correlation of any m nodes in M sensing nodes set is:
Considering the practical situation, we set k = 128, m = 15, M = 200, then we can infer that Pr ≤ 2 −54 , this value could certainly be ignored.
IV. WEIGHTED THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION FOR SENSING NETWORKS
In this section, we propose threshold authentication scheme based on weights. The higher of weight stands for the more important role in authentication. Moreover, the proposed scheme is based on the symmetric operator key assignment scheme proposed in the previous section. It only uses the multiplication on the finite polynomial domain to match the computation power of each sensing node and reduce the burden of these sensing nodes. .
, where TV i is the set of all sensing nodes with weight
Definition 2: Sensing nodes N 1 , . . . . . . , N k l complete the threshold signature together based on weight, if the weight of the participating nodes is greater or equal to K, which is expressed as:
where k is a positive integer which represents the threshold value.
The proposed scheme becomes a typical (k, n) threshold signature only if V 1 = . . . . . . . = V t = V 0 . In another word, only the union with k/V 0 or more sensing nodes can launch the signature process, which in turn means any union contained less than k/V 0 nodes cannot complete the signature at all.
If V 1 V 2 + . . . . . . . + V t , the scheme in this paper will become a threshold signature with privilege set V 1 . That means the sensing node union which contains the threshold value of the privilege set V 1 or more of that can launch the signature process. In another word, those unions with less than the threshold value of the privileged set nodes cannot complete the signature procedure no matter how many other nodes participate in.
Suppose that group G is an order q multiplication generation group with generator g, q is a large prime number which donated as q = 2 n − 1, Z q is a domain. H : {0, 1} * → Z q is a security-encoded hash function. Obviously GF(2 n )\0 is a 2 n − 1-order multiplication cyclic group.
B. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION WITH WEIGHTS
Consider the weighted authentication scheme of sensing networks with threshold equation. 
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
The key distribution manager KDS selects the polynomial
where f (0) = sk is the shared key. Calculate and distribute the public key pk = g sk .
The key distribution manager KDS selects primary id id 1 , . . . . . . , id c (these id are different positive integers), and establish the key fragments as follows: 3) The challenger calculates the sum of all signature fragments as s = s i j and verifies this process as follows:
That is g s r = pk H (m) .
3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that this scheme can cover all possible integer solutions of the indeterminate equation
It is pretty clear that any union of the nodes whose sum of weights is less than the threshold value should not complete the signature procedure. In another word, the unions whose sum of weights is equal to the threshold or more than that could complete the signature procedure. Thus, the scheme can resist the collusion attack from any union whose sum of weights is less than the threshold value. Based on the threshold and discrete logarithm problems, the proof progress of this scheme is illustrated in detail as follows:
The security analysis is based on the discrete logarithm problem:
Discrete Logarithm Problem: For large integer group, after given the random number z ∈ G, it is difficult to find r(r > 1) to satisfy the equation g r = z. The security proof procedure of the proposed scheme can be illustrated by the following theorems:
Theorem 1: We assume that there exists an adaptive chosen message and identity attacker F can break this Each node ID i j computes separately the following formulas.
scheme in PPT time with probability ε which cannot be ignored. Then there exists an algorithm C who can solve the problem of discrete logarithm in the PPT time with a probability ε that cannot be ignored. O(ε) represents ε is not less than a constant which is related to the random oracle function q H 1 , q H 2 , q L , with no relation with the safety parameter n. Proof: We assume that C is a challenger, the goal of C is eventually output a solution to the discrete logarithm problem through calling F.
(1) C runs the setup algorithm. Challenger C maintains the signature public keys sequence pk 1 , . The attacker F interacts with C, while C outputs its responses according to the policy above.
When F stops inquiring the result, F outputs a signature s j related with m i (The signature of m i has never been asked before), which also satisfies Ver(m j , s j ) = 1. C recovers item {m j , h j } from the list H L 1 , and recovers other items {m j , h j } from the list H L 2 . If z = pk H (m j ) / h j , then we could predict that g s = z. That means we finally solve the discrete logarithm problem.
If z = pk H (m j ) / h j equals to a certain m j that has been asked before, we can obtain the probability of that is q L 2 n according to drawer principle. Therefore, the probability of successfully solve the discrete logarithm problem by C remains the same,
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We suppose that V = {2, 3} is the weight set of sensing nodes ID = {1, . . . . . . , 8}. Weighted threshold authentication is defined as follows:
We select the following polynomial:
f (x) = 11 + x 6 mod 13,
where f (0) = 11 is the shared key. Let the primary identify id 1 , . . . . . . , id 20 = 1, . . . . . . , 20, and calculate: 20 to the sensing nodes of TV 2 , each node get three keys.
The core of the threshold signature is the indirect recovery of the threshold key in the operation procedure. The key recovery process in this scenario is described as follows: we assume that (2, 1) is the solution of the equation, in another words, there are two nodes and a node involved in the key recovery from TV 1 and TV 2 , respectively. Above all there are total S i of number 7 involved in key recovery process. Because the power number of f (x) is 6, key f (0) = 11 is restored after using the Lagrange theorem.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 2 , we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with the existing schemes, with m nodes participated in the signature and the average weight V 0 . In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set id 1 , id 2 , . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . . . , that is, the primary identify is integer series beginning with 1, and V 0 (k + 1) E. We can see from table 2, the computation complexity of the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase performed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the scheme [50] , and it can match the computational power of the sensing nodes.
As we can see from Fig.3 , the computation complexity (The abscissa unit is E) of the signature phase is much lower than that of scheme [50] . For example, when the average weight of sensor nodes is 50, the average calculations of scheme [50] is about 50E, however the average calculations of the proposed method is about 2.5E, which is much lower than scheme [50] . Therefore, the scheme has better computation efficiency.
V. IMPROVED WEIGHTED THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION FOR SENSING NETWORKS
In the previous section, we propose a weighted authentication scheme with integer weight threshold. It can solve the problem of joint verification of nodes with different weighted levels, and it is more efficient compared with those existed signature schemes. However, we can see from Table 1 that the burden of sensing nodes was rising rapidly with the increasing range of weights V = {V 1 , . . . . . . , V t }. For instance: considering the following threshold equation:
Now, the key management center exploits those polynomials with 2002 power to assign the sub keys to each sensing node. That means the calculation of multiplication have to allocate on average, which could create burden for each sensing node.
Transform the formula above through divided by about 1001 inequality, and then we get:
The related parameters of this threshold equation are much smaller than those of the original equation. Therefore, we focus on a more efficient threshold proof scheme for the above equations in this section.
A. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION BASED ON FRACTION WEIGHTS
Considering fraction-based weights threshold equation as follows:
where 
In order to describe more clearly in the subsequent sections, TV i is defined as a set of sensing nodes corresponding to x i , with the size of this set is c i .
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
The key distribution manager KDS exploits the polynomial f (x) defined on Z q which donated as:
We assume that f (0) = sk is the shared key. KDS calculates and published the public key pk = g sk .
Suppose that:
The key distribution managers exploit primary identity id 1 , . . . . . . , id c to generate the key fragments S 1 , . . . . . . , S c as follows:
2) We suppose that:
3) The key distribution manager exploits the key fragments S p i +1 , . . . . ., S p i +k i to generate the key again, then deliver the fragments to the nodes in the TV i in turn. The polynomial selected by the key distribution manager KDS is expressed as:
For each node ID i j in TV i set, we calculate that N i (i = 1, . . . , m) , we use KDS to select a single-signed key sk i and calculate r i = g sk i . Then we add (ID i , r i ) item to the public signature list and send sk i to N i through the secure channel. Different from the generation of shared key, a single-signed key sk is generated in each signature generating process. In order to reduce the burden in each sensing node beyond normal interaction, KDS uses mass generation or mass-produce techniques.
2) PROTOCOL DESIGN
Suppose that the sensing nodes N 1 , . . . . . . , N k l participate in the signature process, where the number of these sensing nodes in TV i set is c i . H is the security-encoded hash function. Then we assume that λ i is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the primary identification N 1 , . . . . . . , N k l which we have mentioned before. Our construction is described as follows. The node ID i j sends the signature result s i j to Sink node. 2) Sink node collects all signature fragments V = {3, 5} of all nodes, combines them with V = {3, 5} and sends this final signature to the challenger party.
3) The challenger calculates the sum of all signature fragments, donated as s = s i j and verifies this process as g S r, shown at the bottom of this page. This procedure can also be expressed as: g s r = pk H (m) .
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3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that any x 1 , . . . , . . . , x t satisfied the equation
can obtain k values of f (x), so the signature process can be achieved. According to the features of key distribution, signature combinations that do not satisfy the threshold equation will not have enough key fragments. Moreover, they cannot be encrypted, signed and execute other steps. Therefore, this program can resist any collusion attack that is less than the threshold value.
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We suppose that V = {3, 5} is the weights set of the sensing nodes ID = {1, . . . . . . , 8}. Threshold authentication is defined as follows:
The equation is divided by 15 on both sides:
Let f (x) = 7 + 4x mod 13, where f (x) = 7 is the shared key.
Let the primary identify id 1 , . . . . . . , id c = 1, 2, 3, 4, and we calculate that:
Let TV 1 = {1, . . . . . . , 5}, TV 2 = {6, . . . . . . , 11}, and define the following polynomials:
For each node ID i ∈ TV 1 , the key distributed to this node is f 1 (ID i )f 2 (ID i ).
For each node ID i ∈ TV 2 , the key distributed to this node is f 3 (ID i )f 4 (ID i ).
The core technique of the threshold signature procedure is the indirect recovery of the threshold key in the operation. The key recovery process for this scenario is illustrated as follows:
We assume that there are five nodes in TV 1 and three nodes in TV 2 , respectively involved in the key recovery process. The key recovery process is described in the followings: First of all, the five nodes in TV 1 exploit Lagrangian multiplier method to recover the eleventh key of f 1 (x), then the three nodes in TV 2 take advantage of Lagrangian multiplier method to recover the key of f 3 (x). Finally, we use 6 and 11 to get f (0) = 7 by Lagrangian multiplier method.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 3 we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with the existing scheme, with m nodes participated in the signature and the average of M i is M 0 .
In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set id 1 , id 2 , . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . ., that is, the primary identify is integer series beginning with 1, and M 0 (k + 1) E. We can see from table 3, the computation complexity of the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase performed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the scheme [50] , and it can match the computational power of the sensing nodes.
B. THRESHOLD AUTHENTICATION BASED ON HYBRID WEIGHTS
Consider the threshold equation of hybrid weights, which is donated as:
We suppose that M 1 , . . . 
TV i is a set of sensing nodes corresponding to x i , and the size of this set is c i .
1) KEY DISTRIBUTION
First of all, the key distribution manager KDS exploits the polynomial f (x) defined on Z q , which is donated as:
where f (0) = sk is the shared key. KDS calculates and publish the public key pk = g sk . 30120 VOLUME 7, 2019
Choose the primary identity id 1 , . . . . . . , id c , and generate the key fragments S 1 , . . . . . . , S c in the following steps.
1) Then we denote
2) The key distribution managers exploit the key fragments, which is donated as S p i +1 , . . . . ., S p i +k i to generate the key again, then delivers the fragments to the nodes in the TV i in turn. The polynomial selected by the key distribution manager KDS is expressed as: 
For each node ID i j in TV i , we calculate N i (i = 1, . . . , m) , KDS selects a singlesigned key sk i , then we calculate r i = g sk i , add (ID i , r i ) to the public signature list and send sk i to N i by the secure channel. Different from the generation of shared key, a singlesigned key sk is generated in each signature generating process. In order to reduce the burden in each sensing node beyond normal interaction, KDS uses mass generation or mass-produce techniques. For each node ID i j in TV i , we calculate that
Assume that sk i j is the single-signed key of ID i j , and for node ID i j we calculate
Then node ID i j will send the signature result s i j to Sink node. 2) Sink node collects all signature fragments s j i of all nodes, combines them with m and sends this final signature to the challenger party.
3) The challenger the sum of all signature fragments, donated as s = s i j and verifies this process as r and g s r, shown at the top of this page, which can be also indicated as g s r = pk H (m) .
3) FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is obvious that any x 1 , . . . . . . , x t satisfying the equation
can get n c values of f (x), so the signature process can complete successfully. According to the characteristics of key distribution, signature combinations that do not satisfy the threshold equation will not have enough key fragments. Moreover, they cannot be encrypted, signed and execute other steps. Therefore, this scheme can resist any collusion attack that is less than the threshold value.
4) CASE ANALYSIS
We consider the following threshold equation with hybrid weight
Whose corresponding integer equation is:
where f (x) = 7 is the shared key. Let the primary identify id 1 , . . . . . . , id c = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and then calculate
Let TV 1 = {1, . . . . . . , 3}, TV 2 = {4 . . . . . . , 9}, TV 3 = {10, . . . . . . , 16}, and define the polynomials as follows:
The keys distributed to each node ID i ∈ TV 1 are expressed as:
The keys distributed to each node ID i ∈ TV 2 are expressed as:
The keys distributed to each node ID i ∈ TV 3 , are expressed as:
The core technique of the threshold signature procedure is the indirect recovery of the threshold key during operations. The key recovery process for this scenario is illustrated as follows:
We assume that there are 2 nodes in TV 1 as well as 2 nodes in TV 2 involved in the key recovery process with no node in TV 3 involved in the same process. The key recovery is described in the following steps:
First of all, the 2 nodes in TV 1 exploit Lagrangian multiplier method to recover the eleventh key of f 1 (x), then the 2 nodes in TV 2 take advantage of Lagrangian multiplier method to recover the sixth key of f 3 (x). Finally, we use 6 and 11 to get f (0) = 7 by Lagrangian multiplier method.
For other solutions of the same equation such as (2, 0, 2) and (0, 2, 2). The recovery method is same as we mentioned before.
5) VALIDITY
In Table 4 we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with the existing scheme, with m nodes participated in the signature and the average of b i M i is M b . In the three phases mentioned before, only signature phase is completed by sensing nodes. E represents exponential operation of large numbers, k represents the threshold. Set id 1 , id 2 , . . . . . . = 1, 2, . . . . ., that is, the primary identify is integer series beginning with 1, and M b (k + 1) E. We can see from table 3, the computation complexity of the proposed scheme, especially the signature phase performed by the sensing nodes, is much lower than that of the scheme [50] , and it can match the computational power of the sensing nodes.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Due to the higher complexity and the work by the equality of members, the existing threshold authentication schemes cannot be suitable to the circumstance with various sensing nodes. In this paper, we firstly propose key distribution scheme in sensing networks based on symmetric operators. By the permutation function, the proposed scheme could generate feature sequences to improve the efficiency of key distribution in the sensing networks. In addition, we propose a weighed threshold authentication scheme based on weight value level. The higher the weight of the sensing node is, the greater the role of the node plays, and vice versa. The proposed scheme only uses finite multiplicative operations, which can match the computing power of the sensing nodes and reduce the burden of each sensing nodes.
In future, we will mainly focus on the improvement of threshold authentication scheme based on weights to be adapted to different applications of IoT.
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